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Whether Insurers Must Defend PRP
Notifications: An Expensive Issue
Complicated By Conflicting Court
Decisions
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act' (CERCLA) represents Congress' effort to provide
the federal government with the statutory mechanism necessary to
control the cleanup of toxic waste pollution and attach financial
liability to responsible parties. 2 The combination of CERCLA's
unprecedented liability scheme and notoriously poor drafting, however, has generated a great deal of litigation from responsible
parties seeking to avoid the potentially staggering liability for
cleanup costs. In an overwhelming show of support for CERCLA,
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabililty Act
(CERCLA) Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter CERLCA].
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1016; 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 6119 (CERCLA House Report).
3. See L. SiLVERmAN & P. EssIG, Stacking of Policy Limits and Joint and Several
Liability of Insurers in Cases Involving Long-Term, Cumulative Injury or Damage, in
INSUIAUNCE, EXCESS, AND RENSuRANCE COVERAGE DisPuTEs 45 (P.L.I. Order No. H45062, 1989) (Westlaw screen PLI/Lit 45, 1-2 of 27) ("[E]nvironmental laws imposing
liability for the clean up of pollution or contamination which took place over several
decades have resulted in an explosion of insurance coverage litigation of unprecedented
magnitude."). Though an exhaustive survey is beyond the scope of this comment, the
following cases are a sample of CERCLA litigation; United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)
(CERCLA's retroactive liability does not violate the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause of the fifth amendment); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D.
Colo. 1985) (government may recover response costs incurred before the enactment of
CERCLA); United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind.
1988) (CERCLA preempts state tort claims acts); SCA Services of Indiana, Inc. v.
Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355, 1370 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (a hearing given by the Environmental
Protection Agency prior to assessing costs against potentially responsible parties satisfed
due process where the agency listed the site in question on the National Priorities List
before giving owner of site a hearing); Dickerson v. Administrator, 834 F.2d 974 (1lth
Cir. 1987) (Environmental Protection Agency needs only a reasonable basis for believing
that a release or threat of release of hazardous substances is present to take response
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the courts have responded by broadly construing CERCLA's provisions and the government's power to enforce them. 4 With CERCLA's legitimacy beyond reproach, responsible parties continue to
seek avoidance of cleanup costs by challenging an issue that began
with CERCLA but has seen no uniform judicial answer: whether
comprehensive general liability5 (CGL) insurance policies include
liability for CERCLA-related costs? 6
action); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 837 (1989) (CERCLA may impose successor liability on
corporations which have either merged with or consolidated with a responsible party
corporation); United States v. R. W. Meyers, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1527 (1990) (overhead expenses from a government cleanup can be
recovered in a section 107 cost recovery action); Eagle Picher Indus. v. United States
EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (despite an exemption under section 101(14)(c),
mining waste and fly ash can be "hazardous substances" if they fall under any of the
criteria of that section); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 628 (D.N.H. 1988)
(Environmental Protection Agency is not required to give potentially responsible parties
an opportunity to clean up a site before the agency undertakes response actions); United
States v. Vineland Chemical Co., 692 F. Supp. 415, 423 (D.N.J. 1988) (section 122(a),
which gives the Environmental Protection Agency the discretion whether to use section
122 procedures, is not subject to judicial review); United States v. Hardage, 733 F.
Supp. 1424, 1438 (W.D. Oki. 1989) (indirect costs incurred by the Department of Justice
including costs of office space, utilities, and supplies can be considered recoverable
response costs); United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1271
(D. Mass. 1988) (section 104 provides the Environmental Protection Agency with a right
to enter privately owned property and commence response actions); United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.N.J. 1983) (the scope of liability under section 107 is
applicable to section 106); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp.
1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (section 107 should be broadly construed so as not to
frustrate the recovery of cleanup costs); United States v. South Carolina Recycling &

Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, sub nom.

United States v.' Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
3156 (1989) (a lessee of a facility may be held responsible under section 107(a) as an
owner/operator).
4. See cases cited supra note 3.
5. American Home Prods. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 148889 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, aff'd, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing CGL as
"a standard form policy for liability coverage drafted during the 1960's by representatives
of the insurance industry to deal with the problem of liability for injuries caused over a

period of time"). See Note, The Superfund Insurance Dilemma: Defining the Super
Risks and Rights of Comprehensive GeneralLiability Policies, 21 IND. L. REV. 735, 742

(1988) [hereinafter Superfund InsuranceDilemma] ("CGL policies are third party liability
insurance policies that protect insureds against liability that they become legally obligated

to pay to others .... ).
6. J.TELEGO, Risk FinancingAlternatives and the Pollution Liability Insurance
Marketplace, in PRAcTIcAL APPROACHES TO REDUCE ENVIRoNMENTAL CEANup CosTs

233, 235 (Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 317, 1988) ("[Olver

1990:579]

WHETHER INSURERS MUST DEFEND PRP NOTIFICA TIONS

581

A crucial aspect of this issue lies in the determination of
7
insurers' duty to defend Potential Responsible Party (PRP) noti-8
fications. Once notified of potential liability under CERCLA,
insured PRPs have sought out their insurers for defense of CER-

CLA enforcement procedures and indemnification in the event of

liability.9 Insurers have refused to defend PRP notifications for the
same reasons insureds request defense; neither wishes to absorb the
costs involved,' 0 and responsibility for defense may indicate rethe past several years carriers providing [CGL] policies have been subject to unique
court interpretations relative to finding defense and indemnification for cleanup costs
and damages.... [O]f the sixty plus cases litigated to date there is no apparent trend
favoring either the insurer or insured.").
7. Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) are notified of their status pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1), CERCLA § 122(e)(1), which provides in part: "Whenever the
President determines that a period of negotiation under this subsection would facilitate
an agreement with potentially responsible parties for taking response action (including
any action described in 9604(b) of this title) and would expedite remedial action, the
President shall so notify all such parties .... ." Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), § 122(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (Supp.
IV 1986).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1), CERCLA § 122(e)(1). After the EPA investigates a
toxic waste site and makes an official search for parties who are in some way responsible
for the pollution, it notifies those parties considered "potentially" responsible while it
continues to research the site. At the point of notification of potential responsibility, a
party has three options: 1) do nothing and wait for the government to recover costs; 2)
cleanup the site or join with other notified parties in a cleanup; or 3) litigate with the
government in hopes of securing a more favorable result at some point in the future.
M. LATHROP, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims From the Insurers' Perspective, in
ENvRoNmENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAims 141, 157 (Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 495, 1989).
9. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability
Defense and Cleanup Costs: The Need for a Nonlitigation Approach, 19 ELR 10203,
10203-04 (1989). See L. SiLvERmAN & P. Essia, supra note 3, at Westlaw screen 2
("[C]ompanies in the industries that have borne the brunt of the new or expanded
liabilities created by the courts and the legislatures have turned to the insurance companies
that over the years have sold them [CGL] insurance policies . . ").
10. Id. See Cordes, Who Gets the Bill?: Determining Insurers' Duty to Defend
and Indemnify Against Hazardous Waste Clean-up Costs Under General Liability
Policies, 18 ENvTL. L. 931, 932 (1988) (the potential costs of CERCLA liability are so
high that generators have found it in their best interest to fully litigate insurers' liability,
regardless of the cost of litigation). Insurers faced with the high cost of defending and
indemnifying insureds will commonly seek declaratory judgements which determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties without leaving the insurer responsible for wrongful
refusal to defend. Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv. 239, 240 (1982);
Dahoney, The Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 451, 482-83
(1981); see also Superfund Insurance Dilemma, supra note 5, at 738.
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sponsibility for indemnification." Both insurers and insureds recognize that a court's decision whether to require defense of PRP
notifications extends to the underlying undecided issue of spreading
2
the burden of CERCLA cleanup costs.'
The courts have not been able to produce a definitive answer
to the issue of PRP notification defense 3 for several reasons. First,
courts tend to have varying interpretations of policy language
because courts not only interpret the terms of insurance policies as
a matter of law,' 4 but also have discretion as to the method of
interpretation employed.'" Second, the interpretation of a CGL
policy with respect to potential coverage for PRP notifications is
inherently complex, because such notifications represent a form of
liability that does not fit into the traditional categories established
by pre-1980 6 policy language. 7 Third, the courts' discretion may

11. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
12. See also M. POPE & E. RICKERT, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims:
Insurance Disputes at the Primary, Excess and Reinsurance Level, in ENVRmoNssrAL
AND ToXIc TORT CLAnMS 287 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 495, 1989).
13. Hapke, Federal Circuit Court Decisions Contaminate Superfund Policy, 19
ELR 10393, 10393 (1989) ("Although CGL policies have existed for years, their
application in the hazardous waste context has been anything but certain.").
14. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37, 41 (6th Cir. 1964). See, e.g.,
Note, The Calculus of Insurer Liability in Asbestos Related Disease Litigation: Mani-

festation + Injurious Exposure = Continuous Trigger, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1141, 1148

(1982) [hereinafter The Calculus of InsurerLiability] (when determining liability a court
is guided by contract principles, insurance law, and public policy considerations); see

Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the

Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1175 (1982) [hereinafter A

Common Law Alternative].
15. S.GOLDBERG & J. SILBERFELD, JurisdictionIssues, and ProceduralProblems,
in INSURANCE LTGATION AND COVERAGE ISSUES 237, 239 (Commercial Law and Practice

Course Handbook Series No. 382, 1986) (All of these cases are decided under state law.
There is no federal common law on insurance construction: a federal court in diversity
jurisdiction will apply state law for policy interpretation in the same manner as a state
court.).
16. T. HAMILTON & K. KowAL, The 1986 Commercial Liability Policy Claims
Made Form, in CURRENT PROBLEMS AND IsstUEs IN LL~marv INSURANCE 13 (Commercial
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 421, 1987); see Hapke, supra note 13,

at 10393 (Post-1980 policies, such as claims-made policies, are more precise in defining
the scope of coverage than traditional CGLs, and accordingly have not been the subject
of significant litigation to date).
17. B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DisPUTEs
§ 8.03 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] ("CERCLA created unique hybrid remedies
consisting of both monetary relief and cleaning up the site, and in some cases, fines and
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be affected by their awareness of the economic implications of
deciding which parties should bear the cost of defending the PRP
notifications."8 The magnitude of this policy decision is evident
from the contrast between the courts' virtual unanimity over issues
challenging CERCLA's legitimacy and the conflict currently existing in the state and federal courts over the insurers' duty to defend
PRP notifications. 9 The courts have clearly viewed upholding
CERCLA as necessary to address the hazard and cost of toxic
waste pollution, but they disagree as to how that cost should be
20
spread.
This comment focuses on the way in which courts have produced conflicting interpretations of CGL policy language when
faced with the new form of liability presented by a PRP notification, and the ramifications of the conflicting decisions upon insurers. Section II examines the three components of the conflict: A)
rules of construction applicable to insurance policies; B) CERCLA;
and, C) the duty to defend under CGL policies. Section III reports
the way in which courts have interpreted the disputed CGL language. Section IV analyzes the courts' methods of interpretation.
Section V discusses the ramifications of extending insurers' liability
to encompass PRP notifications. Finally, section VI recommends
that insurers take a nonlitigative approach to an insured's claim of
defense.
II.

COMPONENTS OF THE CONFLICT

A. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE TO INSURANCE
POLICIES

Courts' interpretations of policy language have varied in insurance disputes over CERCLA coverage because the rules of
construction, as applied to insurance policies, allow courts great
penalties which do not fall within the scope of coverage historically contemplated by the
CGL insurer."); see Cordes, supra note 10, at 939 (while a major function of insurance
law is the regulation of risk distribution, courts' inexperience and unfamiliarity with the
interpretation of liability policies in the hazardous waste context makes it very difficult
for them to regulate effectively).
18. See M. LATHROP, supra note 8, at 163.
19. See supra cases cited at note 3; Gordon & Westendorf, Liability Coveragefor
Toxic Tort, Hazardous Waste Disposal and Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHo L.
REv. 567, 607-12 (1988-89). Hapke, supra note 13, at 10393 (to date, the state and lower
federal courts have been split in determining whether coverage should be required or
what scope the coverage should embrace).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 115-159.
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discretion in this area. 2' The rules of construction are designed to
give effect to the intent of the parties at the time the policy contract
was made, 22 and accordingly, courts should examine policy language
to determine intent because it is considered "[tihe best evidence of
what the parties to an agreement intended .
"..."23This "plain

meaning" rule provides that where the policy language is clear and
unambiguous a court must enforce it as written and not impose a
result different from that required by policy provisions. 24

After examining the policy language, however, a court may
find it ambiguous 2 where the language is reasonably susceptible to
more than one interpretation.26 Each interpretation offered must
be objectively reasonable; 27 an ambiguity should not be held to
exist solely on the basis of an assertion. 28 Where an ambiguity
exists, the court must look beyond the policy language to discern
the parties' intent. 29 Extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent at the
time the policy was made is admissible, "not to vary or modify the

terms of the agreement nor to add or to detract from its terms, but
to aid in ascertaining the true intent of the parties." 3 0

21. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.01.
22. Id. § 1.01[a]. See Eastern Associated Coal v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632
F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1980) (The court's duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties as
manifested in the language of the agreement. Courts should read insurance policy
provisions so as to avoid ambiguities.).
23. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.01[al.
24. Id. ("As a general rule, the language of an insurance policy will be given its
plain meaning and there will be no resort to rules of construction unless an ambiguity
exists.... If the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous and the meaning of
the contract can be discerned, a court will give effect to that meaning.").
25. Id. § 1.01[b] (the court makes this determination as a threshold question of
law).
26. Id. § 1.02.
27. Id. ("A word or phrase is ambiguous when it is capable of more than a single
meaning when 'viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined
the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs,
practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or
business."') (citations omitted) (quoting Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d
23, 27 (2d. Cir. 1988)).
28. Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Mich.
1989).
29. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[a]. See 3 G. CoRBN, CoNTRACTS 542 (1960).
30. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[a] (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Cas.
Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953, Dec'n Concerning Phase Issues, 9 (Cal. Super. Ct.
San Mateo County Oct. 6, 1988) (the court may look to extrinsic evidence of custom
and usage where it gives particular meaning to policy language)). See, e.g., Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Given that the
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If a court cannot determine the intent of the parties after
consideration of extrinsic evidence, only then may other rules of
construction be applied to resolve the ambiguity." The primary
"other rule" of construction applicable to ambiguous insurance
contracts is the contra-insurer rule.3 2 The contra-insurer rule requires that ambiguities in policy language be construed against the
insurer." In cases involving ordinary consumers, the insurer, preparer of the form, is presumably responsible for creating the
policyholder's expectations of coverage.3 4 Therefore, construing a
policy strictly against the insurer serves as a consumer protection
device."
A variation on the contra-insurer rule resolves ambiguities in
' 3 6 of the insured.3 7
accordance with the "reasonable expectations
In theory, courts use the reasonable expectations rule to interpret
the meaning of the policy language according to "what a reasonable
person in the position of the insured would have understood it to
mean."38 As a practical matter, when a court gives effect to the
primary goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intentions of the parties, a
district judge, sitting without a jury, might be well advised to admit provisionally all
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent .... ") (citations omitted); cf. Fireman's Fund
Ins. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 469, 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 207 (Cal.
App. 1st Dist. 1986) (the court frowned on insured's obvious insistence that policy
language was ambiguous in order to introduce certain extrinsic evidence).
31. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.01[c].
32. Id. (the contra-insurer rule originated from the doctrine of contra-preferendum,
which means "against the offeror").
33. Id. § 1.03[b].
34. Id. (the presumption that the insurer is responsible for insured's expectations
because the insured has little or no control over the content of the contract forms the
basis for the "contra-insurer" rule of construction); the rationale for the contra-insurer
rule was summarized by the court in Mathews v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 154 N.Y.
449, 48 N.E. 751 (1897): "The policy, although of the standard form, was prepared by
insurers, who are presumed to have had their own interests primarily in view, and hence,
when the meaning is doubtful, it should be construed most favorably to the insured,
who had nothing to do with the preparation thereof." Id. at 456-57, 48 N.E. at 752.
35. K. ABRAAM, DisTRmiTrnm RISK 103 (1986).
36. A Common Law Alternative, supra note 14, at 1184 ("The doctrine of
reasonable expectations was created specifically as a tool for the interpretation of
ambiguities within insurance contracts."). See Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 961, 967 (1970) (underlying the ambiguity
doctrine is the idea that the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured will be
enforced even if the policy does not necessarily read that way); see also Superfund
Insurance Dilemma, supra note 5, at 746.
37. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[b][2]. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 35, at
102.
38. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 103[b][2][A]. But see Uniroyal Inc. v. Home
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insured's "reasonable expectations," it essentially accepts the insured's asserted expectations regardless of their reasonableness. 9
Deciding to accept the insured's "reasonable expectations" in this
manner is often outcome determinative, a result clearly invited by
the concept of contra-insurer rules. 40 Because the contra-insurer
rule was developed specifically to protect inexperienced insureds,
its harsh results have been challenged when used in other contexts. 4'
Use of contra-insurer rules in business insurance has been refuted
in several courts, 42 primarily because in litigation between two
commercial parties there is no need to protect the insured from his
4
or her inexperience. 1
The initial interpretation of the policy language undertaken by
courts in duty to defend PRP notification cases is crucial because
application of the contra-insurer rule generally depends on initially
finding the policy language ambiguous. 44 However, the conflicting
decisions of the state and federal courts demonstrate the confusion
Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The best and most recent
explanation is that the policy should be viewed as if by a reasonably intelligent business
person who is familiar with the agreement and with the industry in question.").
39. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[b][2][A] (citing Grinnel Mut. Reins. Co. v.
Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), ("[Ihe reasonable expectations
of the insured may be given effect [e]ven if careful examination of the policy provision
would negate that expectation.").
40. See infra text accompanying notes 168-179.
41. Because of the conclusive nature of applying contra-insurer rules, it is crucial
that an actual ambiguity exist before the rules are used. See Fried v. North River Ins.
Co., 710 F.2d 1022, 1025 (4th Cir. 1983) ("If there is no real doubt about what the
parties to the contract intended, the rules of construction cannot be used to extend
coverage beyond that reasonably and legitimately implied from the policy.").
42. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[c] (citing Halpern v. Lexington Ins. Co.,

715 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1983) (under Louisiana law, contra-insurer rules will not be
applied to produce an absurd result or when the insured or his broker provides the
disputed policy language)); see also Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174 (3d Cir. 1979) (under Pennsylvania law, insured cannot avoid
the effect of unambiguous language when the parties had relatively equal bargaining
power); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 203 (1986) (the rule of strict construction against the insurer was not applicable
where both parties were large corporate entities). But see Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 113 Wash. 2d 869 (1990) (the court refused to alter its course
of construing an insurance policy based on the fact that the policy was issued to a
corporate giant rather than an individual).
43. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 942, 960-61 (1988).
44. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.01fb] (contra-insurer rules should be used only
after an ambiguity is found that cannot be explained through extrinsic evidence).
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that exists concerning whether the language in the duty to defend
is ambiguous in the context of
clause has a plain meaning or
45
defending a PRP notification.
B. CERCLA

CERCLA provides the legal foundation for shifting the responsibility for cleaning hazardous waste sites to responsible par47
ties," as well as the funding for necessary federal action. In
48 CERCLA
contrast to previous methods of determining liability,
45. See infra notes 117-162 and accompanying text.
46. M. LATHRoP, supra note 8, at 150 (CERCLA section. 106(a) authorizes the
EPA to seek an injunction in federal district court to force a responsible party to cleanup
any site that presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare
or the environment, while CERCLA section 107 gives the EPA power to sue for
reimbursement of cleanup costs from any responsible party it can locate).
47. Id. (CERCLA created a fund, commonly known as "Superfund," to pay for
necessary and authorized government responses. CERCLA section 104 authorizes the
EPA to incur removal and remedial costs, which are undertaken with Superfund money.
However, the EPA uses Superfund money with the expectation of receiving reimbursement through CERCLA section 107. Although the Superfund can be used for genuinely
"orphaned" sites, the law requires that the EPA use the fund as little as possible. The
goal is to place the ultimate burden for costs upon responsible parties.).
48. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting
PROTECTION: LAW AND PoLIcY
ANDEmSON, MANDELKER & TARLOCK, ENvmoNirrmT
568 (1984)) ("CERCLA was designed 'to bring order to the array of partly redundant,
partly inadequate federal hazardous substances cleanup and compensation laws."').
Before CERCLA, the primary federal statute dealing with toxic waste pollution was The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K, which
regulated prospectively from "cradle to grave" as opposed to addressing pollution
generated before its enactment. Hapke, supra note 13, at 10393. Prior to CERCLA's
enactment, applicable theories of recovery under state law were nuisance, trespass,
negligence, strict liability or strict products liability. Harris, Toxic Tort Litigation and
the Causation Element: Is There any Hope of Reconciliation, 40 Sw. L.J. 909, 911
(1986) ("Each theory is fraught with difficulty in the toxic tort context for a number of
reasons, most notably, the causation component of each theory of action is a common
conundrum."). In drafting CERCLA Congress noted the inadequacy of state tort law
schemes stating:
Existing state tort laws present a convoluted maze of requirements under which
a victim is confronted with a complex of often unreasonable requirements with
regard to theories of causation, limited resources, statutes of limitations and
other roadblocks that make it extremely difficult for a victim to be compensated
for damages.
H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADUnm. NEws 6119, 6140-41 (CERLCA House Report). See generally Note, An Analysis
of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS
L.J. 117 (1981) (comprehensive explanation of problems of proof in attempting a cause
of action for hazardous waste injury based on negligence, trespass, or nuisance).
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is very effective at designating responsible parties 49 and enforcing
actions for cleanups against those parties.5 0 CERCLA achieves this
through retroactive application, 5 strict liability,5 2 extensive

49. Anderson, Negotiations and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund,

85 DuKE L.J. 261, 288-94 (1985) (The EPA assigns enforcement personnel to search for
responsible parties while "remedial investigation studies" and "feasibility studies" (RI/
FS) are simultaneously taking place to ensure the most accurate information is used to
designate responsible parties).
50. Id. at 293-95 (Once the EPA notifies a party of its potential responsibility,
the stage is set for the PRP to either engage in a voluntary settlement, force the
government to order cleanup under CERCLA section 106, or have the government
cleanup itself and recover costs under CERCLA section 107. Unless the PRP can
establish one of the limited defenses it will be held liable in some manner).
51. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
Although CERLCA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly
clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect ... the
statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive. CERLCA
authorizes the EPA to force responsible parties to clean up inactive or
abandoned hazardous waste sites, CERCLA Section 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606,
and authorizes federal, state and local governments and private parties to clean
up such sites and then seek recovery of their response costs from responsible
parties, CERCLA Sections 104, 107, 42 U.S.C.Sections 9604, 9607. In order
to be effective, CERCLA must reach past conduct.
Id. at 732-33; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985)
(CERCLA is "by [n]ature backward looking"); see, e.g., constitutionality of retroactive
application addressed in United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
214 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("CERCLA is not an ex post facto law (U.S. Const. Art. I,
section 9, clause 3) because the Constitution's explicit prohibition against ex post facto
lawmaking applies only to criminal laws which inflict punishment."); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (The Court held that retroactive application of
The Black Lung Benefits Act to compensate miners for disease contracted before the
statute's enactment was constitutional and justified as a measure to rationally spread
costs. The Court stated that Congress should have considerable discretion in imposing
liability so long as their approach is reasonable.); Department of Transp. v. PSC
Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980) (New Jersey Spill and
Compensation Control Act held not to be impermissibly retroactive).
52. United States v. Miami Drum Serv., Inc., 1986 WL 15327 (S.D. Fla.) ("Every
court to consider this issue has concluded that, unless one of the defenses under Section
107(b) of CERCLA applies, a party identified as responsible under Section 107(a) is
strictly liable, regardless of fault, for response costs incurred by the government."); see
also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress
intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision
for strict liability was not included in the compromise. Section 9601(32) provides that
'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed to be the standard of liability' under
section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1321, which courts have held to
be strict liability ....

");

United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (F.D.N.C. 1985)
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54
notification procedures," and limited defenses.
Courts have held that Congress intended CERCLA to apply
retroactively in response to the fact that much of the current and
future toxic pollution costs were generated prior to CERCLA's
enactment." Accordingly, CERCLA addresses the need for the
enormous funding necessary to cleanup toxic waste pollution by
holding responsible parties5 6 strictly liable. 7 CERCLA's retroactive
strict liability also reflects the congressional desire to hold polluters
responsible for their pollution.5

(CERCLA section 107(a)(3) was clearly intended to apply to generators of toxic waste
pollution resulting from improper dumping regardless of knowing involvement of the
generator); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Congress meant
to hold generators strictly liable for reimbursement under section 107).
53. Superfund Program: Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange,
53 Fed. Reg. 5298, 5298-5300 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Program] (There are several
notification procedures used by the EPA to facilitate negotiation and information
exchange including general notice letters and RI/FS special notice letters. The purpose
of the general notice is to inform PRPs about their potential liability and begin
information exchange and negotiation. Special notices are similar to general notices
except that they are also used to invoke a statutory moratorium on certain EPA actions.).
54. CERCLA section 107(b) defenses, provides in part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party ....
55. CERCLA, supra note 1, section 107(b). See supra note 51; see also 5 U.S.
CODE & CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws 6119-70 (1980) (legislative history shows Congress
clearly intended CERCLA to address the improperly managed sites already in existence
at the time of CERCLA's enactment).
56. See generally Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA
Cleanup, 42 VANrD. L. Rnv. 1469, 1470 (1989) ("Usually, a toxic waste site, such as a
landfill, will have numerous PRPs: generators; transporters; current owners and their
lessees; former owners and operators ind their successor corporations; individual
corporate officers; and even governmental agencies.").
57. See supra note 52. Congress reaffirmed the application of strict liability in the
SARA amendments. Additionally, PRPs may be jointly and severally liable under
CERCLA for all response costs incurred by federal and state agencies, which may
include investigation costs, litigation costs, salaries and expenses and future costs of
removal or remedial action. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("[w]here the conduct of two or more persons liable under [section]
9607 has combined to violate the statute, and one or more of the defendants seeks to
limit his liability on the ground that the entire harm is capable of apportionment, the
burden of proof as to apportionment is upon each defendant.").
58. See M. LA"mRop, supra note 8, at 158 ("[O]ften overlooked is the fact that
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The EPA is authorized under CERCLA to issue administrative
notices to PRPs to initiate the settlement process, which furthers
the shifting of liability to responsible parties. 9 "PRP notifications" 6°
serve to inform parties that they are potentially responsible for
response costs 6' under section 107 of CERCLA, 62 as well as to
define the scope of potential liability and explain why they have
been identified as PRPs. 63 Notifications are sent to PRPs as early
as possible in the EPA's process of addressing a toxic waste site so
that PRPs may gather adequate information about their potential
liability and have sufficient time to conduct or finance a response
action."
This settlement process is not a matter of traditional bargaining
between parties wherein the PRPs and the government would seek
a mutually satisfactory response to the designated toxic waste
pollution. 65 "Settling" with the government primarily involves formulating an acceptable proposal for cleanup of the pollution under
the assumption of PRP liability. 6 Although PRPs are designated
as "potentially" responsible parties, it is not simply an accusation
of fault as one might find in a traditional cause of action. 67 At the
Congress intended those responsible for pollution, and presumably not their insurers,
should bear the cost of Superfund cleanups."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("mhose responsible for problems
caused by disposal of chemical poisons [should] bear the costs and responsibilities for
remedying the harmful conditions they created."); United States v. Miami Drum Serv.
Inc., 1986 WL 15327 (S.D. Fla.) ("CERCLA is a rational measure to ensure that those
parties who have economically benefitted from waste generation and inexpensive disposal
pay now for its cleanup.").
59. See Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 19, at 569.
60. Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5299.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25), CERCLA § 101(25) (response costs include short-term
removal and long-term remedial cleanup actions and costs associated with any other
related enforcement activities).
62. Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5301.
63. Id. at 5301. See M. LATHRoP, supra note 8, at 153-54 (the EPA need not
identify every party that may have contributed to the release, and is under no obligation
to identify all responsible parties for the purposes of dividing costs among them).
64. Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5301.
65. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
66. PRPs must submit a good faith proposal to the EPA within 60 days of
notification or else the EPA may cleanup the pollution itself, typically at a higher cost,
and then demand reimbursement under CERCLA section 107. See Cassel, Negotiating
Better Superfund Settlements: Prospects and Protocols, S5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. S 117,
S135 (1989) ("Current EPA strategy... is confrontational. Either the PRPs abide by
what EPA wants or the Agency uses the Fund for cleanup.").
67. Pain, Mega-Party Superfund Negotiations, 12 ELR 15054 (1988) (the notifi-
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point of notification the EPA has already found "sufficient evidence to make a preliminary determination of potential liability"
under CERCLA section 107(a). 68 As a result, notified PRPs will be
held liable unless they can establish one of the very limited defenses
69
in CERCLA section 107(b).
The EPA's goal is to obtain complete cleanup by the responsible parties or collect 100 percent of the costs from a goveinment
sponsored cleanup action: 70 The strictness of CERCLA's settlement
scheme in negotiating private party cleanups and settlements of
hazardous waste cases works to effectuate that goal. However,
some elements of the settlement scheme that are crucial to arriving
at the EPA's goal do not translate effectively from their role in
CERCLA to the context of insurance law. 7 ' For example, CERCLA
must attach retroactively in order to hold responsible parties liable
for toxic waste, because toxic waste and its effects may not surface
for many years after the actual polluting occurred. 72 In terms of
insurance, however, coverage is not designed for retroactive liability, such as newly discovered toxic waste problems that could not
have been considered in the original risk assessment.7
Although the use of strict liability in CERCLA's settlement
process does not present a new standard of liability, the PRP
notifications that initiate the settlements are a new form of attaching that liability.7 4 In the insurance context, PRP notifications are
cation usually requests the PRP to respond by informing the government of its willingness
to voluntarily cleanup the site). See Anderson, supra note 49, at 293 (if PRPs do not
respond to initial notice letters, the EPA's next step is to send "drop dead" notice
letters informing the PRPs that they must either follow the EPA's suggested cleanup
"voluntarily" or be forced to comply).
68. Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5301.
69. See supra note 54.
70. Memorandum: Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 15 ELR 30001.
71. See Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203-04 (In the context
of planning for possible risks, toxic waste costs would have been particularly difficult,
if not impossible to predict because of the long latency periods between exposure and

recognized damage. Because of the latency factor, many chemicals have not been
recognized as toxic until they caused recognizable damage 20 years after their actual
use. At the time the policies were written, the now "toxic" chemicals and products were
not considered toxic and their risks were not known or investigated for the purposes of
determining risks in policy coverage.).
72. See generally Note, An Analysis of the Enhanced Risk Cause of Action (Or
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste), 33 Vii. L. Rnv. 437, 44244 (1988) (discussion of typical legal problems associated with the latency of toxic waste).
73. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
74. PRP notifications are a part of CERCLA's "unique hybrid remedies." See
supra note 17.
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problematic because their injunctive form and out-of-court processes are not covered under CGL language. 7 Faced with the fact
that PRP notifications defy definition under traditional policy
language,7 6 yet represent great potential cost to the party responsible

for defending them, courts are left in conflict over whether to
77
incorporate PRP notifications into traditional CGL language.
C. THE DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER CGL POLICIES

The insurance policies involved in this conflict are comprehensive general liability policies (CGLs),78 which contain "duty to
defend" clauses. 79 Duty to defend policy language typically states:

"[T]he Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit
against the insured seeking damages .... ,,80 The key term interpreted by the courts to determine whether the insurer has a duty
to defend is "suit."'" In defining "suit," some courts have interpreted the term in isolation, while others also look to surrounding
75. I. SUI,.vAN & W.

WRIGHTS, JR.,

Hazardous Waste Litigation:CGL Insurance

Coverage Issues, in HAzARDoUs WASTE, Toxic TORT, AND PRODUCTS LIuILTY INSURANCE PROBLEMS 301, 330 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
419, 1987) ("Traditionally courts have held that a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against
an insured is not covered by a CGL policy because it does not seek compensatory
damages."). See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
76. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 n.2 (D. Mass. 1987) (CERCLA's inartful
draftsmanship makes the court's task of ascertaining the law's meaning more difficult
and increases the likelihood that courts around the country will adopt differing approaches to the statute.).
77. Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1465-66 & n.5 (1986) (Congress hastily drafted and passed CERCLA, producing
little legislative history and vaguely-drafted statutory provisions. This has produced a
situation wherein the courts often find themselves ascertaining Congress' intentions for
various CERCLA provisions.).
78. See supra note 5; American Home Prod. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.
Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (detailed explanation of the history and purpose
of the CGL policy). See generally E. ANDERSON & T. SEAR, Insurance Coverage for
Environmental Liability: Technical and Legal Considerations, in ENVIRONMENTAL Am
Toxic TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND 41 (Commercial Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 495, 1989).
79. R. MorT, Hazardous Waste Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability
Policies, in HAzARDoUS WASTE LITIGATION 1988: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL
SOLUTIONs 703 (Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series Number
349, 1988).
80. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 II1.App.
3d 378, 388, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1989).
81. See infra notes 117-159 and accompanying text.
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policy language for an additional definitional benchmark.

2 Because

the duty to defend clause requires a "suit . . . seeking damages,"
the term most often interpreted in conjunction with "suit" is

"damages."" s Whereas suit has been defined as requiring some

type of court proceeding, "damages" can be used to further require
that a particular type of damages be sought in the court proceeding
4
in order to qualify it as a suit.
1. Insurers' Interpretation of the Duty to Defend
Recently, insurers have approached litigation over the duty to
defend clause by asserting that the plain meaning of the policy

language indicates they need only defend insureds if they become
defendants in a traditional lawsuit seeking damages.8 5 This argument seeks to eliminate the duty to defend PRP notifications in

two ways. First, a PRP notification "inform[s] PRPs of their

potential liability for future response costs" as well as facilitates
exchange of information and informal negotiations between parties.8 6 However, because a PRP notification does not require a
87
court proceeding, it is not equivalent to filing a traditional lawsuit.

Second, PRP notifications, like CERCLA cleanup costs, are considered a form of injunctive or equitable relief, 8 whereas

82. See infra text accompanying notes 120-139.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 179-181.
84. Id.
85. See Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 19, at 609 ("The traditional view, held
in a number of jurisdictions, regarded the assertion of a mere claim against the insured
to be insufficient to trigger the duty."); cf. Hapke, supra note 13, at 10393 (editor's
summary) (referring to policy terms "property damage" and "occurrence," the fact that
they were drafted over a decade before CERCLA was enacted means they were obviously
designed to address liability for which insureds had traditionallysought coverage).
86. Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5300.
87. See Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Mich.
1989) ('"[Sluit' plainly means some type of court proceeding. It is undisputed that a
'PRP' letter is not a court proceeding.").
88. See HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at § 8.03[c][2], ("Equitable remedies are
designed to either restore the status quo ante or to prevent threatened future injury,
rather than to provide 'substitution and redress' in the form of money damages."); B.
RozNowsKi, The-Insurance Industry Perspective: Unique Coverage Issues, in ENVURONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAmIS: INsURANCE COVERAGE iN 1989 AND BEYOND 363, 381
n.4 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 495, 1989) ("The basis
for insurers' argument as to the damages issue is the long-standing recognition by courts
that the costs of complying with equitable remedies, whether in the form of injunctive
relief or restitution, are not damages even though a money judgement may be entered
in connection therewith."); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct. 2722, 2732
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"damages" 9 traditionally encompass only legal damages.9 Therefore, insurers conclude that the plain meaning of "suit" necessarily

excludes PRP notifications from the duty to defend.
Historically, the distinction between legal and nonlegal dam-

ages has not been difficult to make in disputes over CGL policy

language. 9' Before 1980, when CGLs were written to include the
(1988) (the ordinary meaning of "damages" is compensatory relief for an injury suffered,
while reimbursement is essentially equitable); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213
(3d Cir. 1982) (injunctions are equitable relief).
89. "Damages," for the purposes of this comment, refers specifically to the term
as used to further define the constitution of a "suit" within the language of the duty to
defend clause. "Damages," in addition to "suit," is also a key term in determining the
insurer's duty to indemnify, and has produced the same legal debate concerning whether
it includes both legal and equitable relief as it has in the duty to defend clause. However,
a complete discussion of the scope of the insurers' duty to indemnify insureds for
cleanup costs under CGL policies is beyond the scope of this comment. For further
information on this issue see generally, Rosenbaum, Insurance, Hazardous Waste, and
the Courts: Unforeseen Injuries, Unforeseen Law, 13 ELR 10204 (1983); Tomar &
Spielberg, New Developments in the Law of Toxic Torts in New Jersey, 18 RuroERs
L.J. 73 (1986-87). Case law dealing with this issue includes: Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (under California
law, "damages" within CGL language includes CERCLA cleanup and investigation
costs); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139
(W.D. Mich. 1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75
(E.D. Mich. 1987) ("damages" may include both legal and injunctive relief); New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987)
(injunctive relief may be considered "damages"); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1987); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. App. 1983) (regardless of the form in which the
government seeks to hold the insured liable under CERCLA, the costs involved should
be considered "damages"); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152
(W.D. Mo. 1986). But see Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 66 (1988); Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v. Milliken and Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 703 (1988); Hayes
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988):
90. Hapke, supra note 13, at 10395. BiACK's LAW DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979)
("Damages. A pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the
court .... "). See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir.
1955) (insurance policy covers payment for damages, not injunctive relief); Continental
Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th
Cir. 1988) (In the insurance context "the term 'damages' is not ambiguous... and...
the plain meaning of the term 'damages' [as] used in the CGL policies refers to legal
damages and does not cover cleanup costs.").
91. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219,
1223, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, 183 (1989) ("[U]ntil the recent spate of environmental pollution
cases, no authority held that such liability insurance policies provide coverage for the
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"duty to defend" clause, the insurer had prepared the contract to
reflect the cost of those risks involved in a "suit" brought against
the insured according to the traditional understanding of the terms

in the clause. 92 In fact, insurers prepared pre-1980 policies without
CERLCA as a consideration in assessing the extent of the risks
potentially covered by their policy language. 93
In order for the insurance system to function effectively,
insurers must know the extent of the risks being insured by their
policies. 94 Insurance can spread the risk of liability among groups
of insureds only where an accurate assessment of the risks has been
made for the purposes of determining premium rates. 95 Once the
extent of the risks is determined, insurers must then be able to rely
on standard terminology for defining those risks. 96 If policy language can be subsequently redefined to expand coverage beyond

what was planned by the insurer, then it nullifies the original risk
assessment. 97 Because the availability of insurance is premised on

the degree of predictability and magnitude of the risk at the time
the insurance contract is written, 98 insurers cannot create effective
insurance without some reliance on basic definitions within policy
language. 99
At the time most of the currently disputed CGLs were written,
CERCLA did not exist and insurers did not expect the courts to
costs of compliance with governmental exercise of the police power, nor for the costs
of responding to an injunction. Accordingly, the parties to these policies cannot
reasonably have expected that there was such coverage.").
92. See id. at 1228, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92.
93. See Rosenbaum, supra note 89, at 10204; see also K. Abraham, supra note
35, at 76-79; Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203.
94. See Rosenbaum, supra note 89, at 10204.
95. 1 J.JoYCE, Tim LAW OF INSURANCE § 17 (2d ed. 1917) (quoting Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 318, 30 A. 217, 219 (1894)) ("The conditions necessary
to the business of insurance are: (a) the existence of a known danger to which all
property owners are exposed, and against which they cannot effectually protect themselves; (b) the strong possibility that loss from this danger will fall upon but few of
those who are exposed to it ....").
96. See generally K. ABRAHmw, supra note 35, at 123-30.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 10-12; see also COUCH, 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 15:4 (2d ed.
1984).
99. Insurers' need to rely on policy language in order to efficiently manage risks
was recognized in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d
31, 33 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Truck Sales, Inc.,
786 F.2d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Mhe court must give all terms their plain meanings
and not rewrite an insurance contract to enlarge the risk." (emphasis added)).
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impose major waste-related liabilities.'0° While insurers are in the
business of insuring against large risks for which individuals cannot
prepare, such as catastrophic illness or hurricane damage, those
types of risks are both known and beyond human control. In the
case of liability for toxic waste pollution, however, Congress took
a problem, seemingly beyond human control, and mandated its
control through unprecedented liability reaching all parties similarly
unprepared to absorb the cost of such liability.
Because insurers did not expect this kind of liability, the risk
assessment that went into pre-1980 CGLs did not reflect the potential cost of toxic waste liability under CERCLA.' 0' Therefore, the
risk of potential CERLCA liability was not spread among polluting
insureds: "[F]rom the insurers' perspective, [insureds] are attempting to draw in carriers who have not agreed to bear the burden of
cleanup costs, and who have not charged premiums commensurate
with the environmental risks.' ' 0 2 Under these circumstances, insurers argue for interpretations of policy language consistent with
traditional definitions to give effect to the coverage intended at the
time the insurance contract was written. 03
2.

Insureds' Interpretation of the Duty to Defend

In contrast, insureds have argued that "suit" is ambiguous
and should be construed to include any effort to impose liability
04
on the policyholder which is ultimately enforceable by a court.
This argument effectively expands "suit" to include a PRP notification because it can be considered an effort to impose liability. 05
Regarding "damages," insureds argue it is the effect of the PRP
notifications, not their form, which should be considered by a
court.' °0 This argument can be used to make the injunctive relief
sought by the PRP notifications acceptable as "damages," essen100. See Hapke, supra note 13, at 10393 ("Liabilities imposed by CERCLA were
not anticipated by either insurers or insureds at the time most policies were originally

issued.").

101. Id. at 10393.
102. Cordes, supra note 10, at 934.
103. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.01[a] (insurers' argument reflects the wellsettled rule of insurance policy construction that insurance contracts, like other contracts,
should be interpreted to effectuate the intent of the parties at the time the contract was
formed).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 149-58.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 149-58.
106. See infra note 182.

1990:579]

WHETHER INSURERS MUST DEFEND PRP NOTIFICATIONS

597

tially erasing the traditional distinction between legal and equitable
relief. 0 7 However, the state and federal courts that have interpreted
the duty to defend clause have arrived at conflicting results, alternately limiting and expanding the scope of coverage to exclude or
include liability for defense of PRP notifications, which neither
insurers nor insureds have prepared to absorb. 08

III.

RECENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT

Recent court decisions concerning the insurers' duty to defend
PRP notifications have been anything but consistent. The conflicting state and federal decisions can generally be broken down into
two categories according to the method of construction used by the
court: 1) courts interpreting the policies according to the plain' °9
or "traditional" meaning of the terms find no duty to defend;" 0
and 2) courts interpreting the policy language to be ambiguous"'
find a duty to defend." 2 Each method of interpretation is highly
discretionary as both turn on each court's perception of the terminology." 3 The impact of this discretion is most apparent in light
of the fact that the courts have interpreted virtually the same duty
to defend policy language and consistently arrived at conflicting
conclusions in direct correlation to the method of interpretation
4
used. "1

107. See United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 58990, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) (the court rejected the insurer's argument that injunctive
order to clean up a site was not "damages," because whether the government chose to
have the insured clean up or cleaned up the site itself, the insured would incur similar
costs).
108. See Abraham, supra note 43, at 960.
109. See HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 101[a]; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
110. Harter Corp. v. Home Indem., 713 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Detrex
v. Employers Ins. v. Hartford Accident Ins., 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. v. Gulf Resources and Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho
1989); see also Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 533
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988) (interpreting "sudden and accidental").

111. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
112. Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich 1987);
Pepper's Steel and Alloys v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541
(S.D.Fla.
Ill. App.
113.
114.

1987), United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180
3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989).
See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 161-164.
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COURTS THAT HAVE FOLLOWED THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE
POLICY LANGUAGE

In Detrex Chemical Industries v. Employers Insurance of Wausau," the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio addressed the issue of whether a PRP notification triggers
16
the insurer's duty to defend.
The parties' dispute focused on the definition of "suit." 1" 7 The
insured argued for an interpretion of "suit" as including a PRP
notification, which the insured represented as "[a] definable claim
or contention [a]sserted that Detrex ha[d] some legal liability for
damage .
"...
"I In contrast, the insurer contended that "suit"
should be interpreted traditionally as "[tihe prosecution of some
demand in a court of justice .... ,9
Faced with these opposing interpretations, the court looked to
the language of the policy to determine the intended meaning. 20
The court began its examination mindful that unambiguous language should be given its plain meaning.' 2' It reasoned that, although the insurance policies at issue did not define "suit," language
surrounding the duty to defend clause might indicate the term's
meaning. 2 2 In a detailed examination of the duty to defend clause,
the court found that, taken in context with the surrounding policy
language, "suit" clearly required a court proceeding. 23 The court
based its conclusion on the fact that the language within the duty
to defend clause referred to "allegations of the suit." This indicated
the traditional meaning of "suit" was intended by implication that
115. 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
116. Dextrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 442
(N.D. Ohio 1987).
117. Id.
118. Id.at 445.

119. Id.
120. The Detrex court focused solely on interpreting the policy language for its
intended meanings and did not get side-tracked by the policy issue of the probable harsh
ramifications on the insured after the PRP notification: "Merely because the PRP letters
to Detrex informed it that it might be liable for cleanup costs, penalties, and punitive
damages under CERCLA does not mean that [the] letters meet the attributes of a suit."
Id.at 446.
121. Id.at 442.
122. Id.at 446.

123. Id.See City of Evart v. Home Ins. Co., No. 86-004019-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct.

Mar. 3, 1987), aff'd, No. 103621, slip op. (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1989) (per curiam)

(held that a PRP letter did not trigger a defense obligation because "suit" clearly and
unambiguously did not include "[allegations, accusations or mere claims which have
not been embodied in a suit"). Slip op. at 2.
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a "suit" must contain the traditional elements of "allegations"
24
seeking damages.
Once the traditional definition of "suit" was established, the
court discussed whether a PRP notification could be considered a
suit. 25 First, it determined that a PRP notification was a claim for
potential future liability. 26 It next compared the use of the terms
"claim" and "suit" within the policy. 27 The court found that the
two terms were intended to describe distinct situations and further
noted that the policy language's differentiation between "claim"
and "suit" was clearly grounded in insurance law. 128 Consequently,
the court held that a "claim" was not intended to have the same
meaning or effect as "suit" and, therefore, a PRP notification was
not sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to defend. 29
Similarly, in Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 30 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the PRP notification sent to the insured did "not
constitute the institution of a 'suit' for the purposes of triggering
the insurer's duty to defend.' 3 ' The court found that the intended
definition of "suit" was clear and unambiguous; "suit" indicated
a legal proceeding in court.3 2 The court stated that the PRP letters
merely informed the plaintiff of its potential liability under CERCLA, and was not the equivalent of the commencement of a formal
legal proceeding within the meaning of the CGL policy.'

124. Dextrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 446
(N.D. Ohio 1987).
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 443-45.
Id.
Id. at 443.

Id. (quoting G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE section 51:43 (2d rev. ed.))
("The mere fact that a claim has been asserted against the insured does not impose any
duty of "defense" upon the insurer, since until an action has been brought against the
insured there is, by definition no claim against which the insured is required to defend").
129. Id. at 445. Accord Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. CIV
C-87-2306 (Utah Dist. Ct. Salt Lake County Mar. 9, 1989).
130. 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (1988).
131. Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d
124, 145, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 104 (1988).
132. Id. at 146, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
133. Id. See County of Broome v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 86-0342, slip op.
at 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Broome County 1988), modified and aff'd on other grounds, No.
57979 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't May 9, 1989). But see City of Johnstown New York
v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York law)
(court stated that the duty to defend is essentially litigation insurance).
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The United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan in Harter Corp. v. Home Indemnity Co. 13 4 conflicted
with an earlier Michigan District Court' by holding that a PRP
notification did not trigger the defendant's duty to defend because
it did not qualify as a "suit" within the language of the duty to
defend clause. 3 6 Although both courts were bound by the same
state law, they came to opposite results because the earlier court
found the policy language ambiguous,' while the court in Harter
did not.' The Harter court stated that, although it was a long
standing principle of Michigan law to construe ambiguous policy
language in favor of the insured, 3 9 "[ulnambiguous language must
be construed as written.' ' 40 The court rejected the insured's con134. 713 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
135. Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
see infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
136. Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Mich.
1989). See Arco Indus. v. Home Indem. Co., No. A87-0218-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan.
4, 1989).
137. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
138. Harter Corp., 713 F. Supp. at 233. The Hartercourt relied on the 6th Circuit
which held that a court must not ignore applicable state law requiring that policy
language be given its plain meaning. Id. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Star Fire Coals, 856 F.2d 31, 33 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Courts should not use tortured logic
to find ambiguity where none exist.") The Harter court examined the main cases relied
upon in Ex-Cell-O, which were Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 102
Mich. App. 136, 301 N.W.2d 832 (1980), and United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983), and found their reasoning unpersuasive. HarterCorp., 713 F. Supp. at 233-34. The Hartercourt pointed out that although
Detroit Edison discussed the duty to defend, it "[d]id not suggest that anything that
arguably resembles a suit must be defended by the insurer," and should not have been
relied upon by Ex-Cell-O for such a proposition. Id. at 233. The Harter court also
pointed out that Aviex's holding that a "suit seeking damages" could include injunctive
relief was not a definitive response to the entire issue because beyond the form of the
damages there must still be some sort of court process to qualify as a suit. Id.
139. Harter Corp., 713 F. Supp. at 233 (citing Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich. App. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939) (The availability of contrainsurer rules of construction does not mean that the plain meaning of plain words
should be perverted. The court should not give well-recognized language an "alien
meaning" for the purpose of benefitting the insured.).
140. Id. at 232. The court's holding that the plain meaning of a word should not
be "perverted" to reach a given end is in accordance with case law against using the
rules of construction in insurance policies to distort contract language or create ambiguities where none exist; see Wozniak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 Mich.
App. 612, 286 N.W. 99 (1939); Dieckman v. Moran, 414 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Mo. 1967)
(Plain and unambiguous language should be given its plain meaning. Contra-insurer
rules may apply where policy language is subject to different interpretations, but the
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tention that a PRP notice was the equivalent of a "suit seeking
damages,' 4' by responding that it could not construe the EPA's
"threat" of liability to be a "suit" because "suit" clearly required
some type of court proceeding. 42 The court held that to find
otherwise would "do violence" to the plain and ordinary meaning
43
of the word. 1
While the courts discussed above found the policy language
unambiguous, their opinions differ from those discussed below in
more than just the results reached. The courts finding the policy
language to include defense of PRP notifications have shorter
opinions which never address the initial stages of discussion over
whether the policy language is ambiguous. Because these opinions
analyze directly under contra-insurer rules, one must assume that
the courts intially found the policy language ambiguous.
B.

COURTS THAT HAVE FOUND THE POLICY LANGUAGE

AMBIGUOUS

In Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 44 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held in a
brief discussion that the insurer had a duty to defend insureds from
their PRP notification. 45 The insurer contended that, according to
the plain meaning of "suit," it should have no duty to defend until
the insureds become involved in a traditional lawsuit for monetary
damages.' 4 6 The court, however, without discussing whether "suit"
was ambiguous, decided it should have a broader construction than
rules do not authorize perversion of the language or the exercise of inventive powers to
create ambiguities where none exist.); Houghton v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 692
F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1982); Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d

903, 912, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, 563, 718 P.2d 920, 924-25 (1986) (a court should not find
policy language ambiguous based on the unreasonable understanding of an insured).

141. Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
(The insured reasoned that Michigan courts had reached opposite conclusions on this
issue. The Hartercourt, however, did not take the other court's conclusions as a sign
of ambiguous language, but simply faulty reasoning. The Hartercourt found the other
courts' conclusion that a PRP notification was a "suit" to be against the plain meaning
of the policy language.).
142. Id. at 233 (citing Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F.
Supp. 438, 442 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1987)) ("[Tlhe word suit cannot be defined without

reference
143.
144.
145.
1987).
146.

to a proceeding in a court of justice.").
Id. at 233.
662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
Id.
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that offered by the insurer. 47 The court reasoned that coverage
should not hinge on the form of action involved, but that a suit
legal process to
could be simply "an actual or threatened use ' of
4

coerce payment or conduct by a policyholder.'
Similarly, in Pepper'sSteel and Alloys v. United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co., 49 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held the insurer had a duty to defend
the insured from a PRP notification.1 0 The court primarily relied
on Florida insurance law which dictated that a contract of insurance
prepared by an insurance company must be liberally construed in
favor of the insured.' 5 ' Without discussing possible interpretations
of the policy language, the court held that any doubt regarding the
2
duty to defend should be resolved in favor of the insured."
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Specialty Coat-

ings Co.,'

an Illinois state appellate court held the insurer had a

duty to defend the insured from a PRP notification. 5 4 The insurer
contended it owed no duty to defend because according to the plain
meaning of "suit," it was not required to defend until an actual
complaint had been filed.'" The court, however, found the threat
of available formal legal action inherent in the PRP notification a
more compelling factor than whether a particular definition of
"suit" was intended by the parties. 5 6 It reasoned that the insured's
potential liability would remain a consideration regardless of the
insured's choice of response to the PRP notification.' 7 Choosing
147. Id. ("[I]nsurers construe their policies too narrowly .. .
148. Id.
149. 668 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
150. Pepper's Steel and Alloys v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp.
1541, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
151. Id. at 1545 (citing Tropical Park, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 357 So.2d
253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)). See Trizec Properties Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co.,
767 F.2d 810, 812 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law) (a court should generally hold
all doubts against the insurer).
152. Pepper's Steel, 668 F. Supp. at 1545. As demonstrated by the lack of discussion
given to whether a PRP notification triggered defense once the contra-insurer rule was
employed, application of the contra-insurer rule is often outcome determinative in
coverage disputes. See Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12
(1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983) (multi-million dollar asbestos coverage
dispute resolved against insurers by application of the contra-insurer rule).
153. 180 Il.App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989).
154. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App.
3d 378, 388-89, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (1989).
155. Id. at 388, 535 N.E.2d at 1078.
156. Id. at 389, 535 N.E.2d at 1079.
157. Id. Accord American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-
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to seek voluntary compliance instead of forcing the government to
cleanup and then initiate a court action to compel reimbursement
would not eliminate the insured's potential liability for cleanup
costs. 158 Therefore, the court considered the notification's attempt
at imposing a liability ultimately enforceable by a court the equiv'59
alent of a "suit.'
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS

The courts in Harter, Detrex, and Technicon all found the
traditional understanding of the word "suit" apparent from the
policy language and did not incorporate PRP notifications into the
insurer's duty to defend. 160 These courts followed the basic rules
of constructing insurance policies by looking to the language in the
1994, (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988) (1988 WL 112142) ("Due to the scope of CERCLA, the
EPA's letter of notification that Levelor was a [PRP] was sufficient to trigger the duty
to defend, since the letter forced Levelor to take legal action to defend its interests.").
158. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill.
App. 3d at 389, 535 N.E.2d at 1079. While neither
of the alternatives in dealing with the EPA after notification will eliminate the insured's
potential liability for cleanup costs, the court's reliance on this fact to expand defense
coverage is problematic. Even if the EPA eventually sought a cost recovery action
against the insured, that action would not necessarily be covered under the insured's
CGL. See Verlan, Ltd. v. John Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 954-55 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (court held that the insurer did not have duty to defend or indemnify the insured
because CERCLA cleanup costs are not "damages" within CGL policy language);
International Minerals v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 168 Ill.
App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988)
(in coverage action against CGL insurers, CERCLA cost recovery claim not considered
"damages"). See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
159. Id. Accord Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314,
1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (The court found that a PRP notification could have immediate
adverse consequences for the insured and concluded that the "administrative process is
part of a 'litigious process' that triggers the obligation to defend."). However, the
Specialty Coatings court's choice not to recognize the distinction between the form of a
PRP notification and the requirements of a "suit," does not comport with the 7th
Circuit's previous upholding of that distinction within the duty to defend clause. See
Fisher v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 329 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying
Illinois law) (Liability insurer's duty to defend is not triggered until suits are filed); Solo
Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188-89 & n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1033 (1980) (Insurer's duty of defense was not triggered by administrative proposal);
see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 960
(D. Idaho 1989) (Even though Gulf attempted to demonstrate that there was little
practical difference between the EPA's enforcement procedures and a civil litigation, the
Aetna court reasoned that "[t]he policies at issue state that the duty to defend is
triggered by a "suit" -not "claim," not "administrative proceeding," but suit ...under
the plain meaning of the policy terms, no duty to defend has been triggered.") (emphasis
added).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 115-145.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

policies to determine the meaning of the disputed term and ending
their inquiry where it was apparent that "suit" had a plain meaning. 161 In doing so, these courts interpreted "suit" according to its
traditionally understood definition and gave effect to the insurers'
asserted intent at the time the insurance policies were written.
Alternatively, the courts in Ex-Cell-O, Specialty Coatings, and
Pepper's Steel found "suit" ambiguous and included notification
of PRP status.' 62 Unlike Harter, Detrex and Technicon, these
decisions appear to rely on equitable considerations instead of clear
analytical interpretations of the policy language. 63 The courts in
Ex-Cell-O, Specialty Coatings, and Pepper's Steel chose not to
discuss the initial question of whether the disputed term "suit"
had a plain meaning, alternatively look to the policy language to
determine its intended meaning, 64 or discuss whether both asserted
interpretations were reasonable before determining that "suit" was
ambiguous. 65 Their choice not to discuss these issues, however,
does fall within the very broad judicial discretion allowed in construction of insurance policies. It is this broad discretion that makes
litigating insurance coverage a tenuous proposition for both insurers and insureds.
Although both parties stand at risk, insurers face a greater risk
of sweeping judicial decisions due to the historically accepted
practice of construing policies against insurers. Contra-insurer construction may omit key facts in order to achieve the prescribed
result. For example, by employing contra-insurer construction without discussing whether the insureds' expectations were reasonable,
the courts in Ex-Cell-O, Pepper's Steel, and Special Coatings
overlooked the fact that insureds' interpretations assumed coverage
under pre-1980 policies for statutory liability that did not exist
66
when the policy was made.'
161. Following the basic rule of construction comports with the contractual nature
of insurance policies. See All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 163
(N.D. Ind. 1970) (The obligation to defend is "purely contractual ... [and] the
obligation on the court is merely to interpret the language of the insurance contract.").
162. See supra notes 144-159 and accompanying text.
163. See Hapke, supra note 13, at 10401; Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 19,
at 609.
164. In the interest of fairness to the parties, it is crucial that both conflicting
interpretations be reasonable before an ambiguity is held to exist. See Producers Dairy
Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins., 41 Cal.3d 903, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, (Cal. 1986) (a court
must not find policy language ambiguous based on the unreasonable understanding of
the insured).
165. See supra notes 144-159 and accompanying text.
166. Since CERCLA did not exist when pre-1980 policies were written nor any
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Straying from the traditional approach of policy interpretation
increases the likelihood that these courts have overlooked the intent
behind the disputed policy language. 67 For example, the court in
Ex-Cell-O made no examination of the policy language to attempt
to ascertain the parties' intent before it concluded that "suit"
should be broadened to include PRP notifications. 16 It appears
that the Ex-Cell-O court skipped the major steps of policy construc169
Simition and simply construed the policy against the insurer.
larly, the court in Pepper's Steel forewent any discussion of
interpretations and explicitly opted for contra-insurer construction.1 70 Because looking at the policy language is the best evidence
of what the parties intended, it seems unlikely that the method of
policy construction these courts utilized could have effectuated the
parties' intent from the time the policy was. written.' 7'
Construing policy language against the insurer without initially
interpreting that language may create the potential for abuse of
judicial discretion. 172 Instead of examining the policy language for
apparent meanings or examining the reasonableness of the parties'
interpretations, a court directly applying contra-insurer rules may
choose the result it finds reasonable to create liability through
construction. 73 The courts in Ex-Cell-O and Specialty Coatings

comparable injunctive device for securing "potential" retroactive strict liability such as
a PRP notification, insurers could not have intended defense coverage for CERCLA
PRP notifications. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
167. See A Common Law Alternative, supra note 14, at 1183-84.
168. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
169. The Ex-Cell-O court did discuss United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983), and rely on its determination that
the legal/equitable distinction should be irrelevant in CERCLA cases. The Ex-Cell-O
court did not, however, at any time mention the respective intents of the parties at the
time the policy was written.
170. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
171. See 1 J. JOYCE, supra note 95, § 45 (The rationale behind looking at the
actual language as used within the policy is that it gives the best indication of the parties'
intent. In this way a court will be far more likely to achieve the goal of giving effect
according to the sense in which the parties understood the agreement when the policy
was made. "[Sluch mutual intention controls as it existed at the time of contracting
. . . .$ ).

172. See A Common Law Alternative, supra note 14, at 1186-87 (citing KEETON,
INSURANCE LAW, § 6.3(a) (1980)); Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy

Provisions, 83 HAgv. L. Rv. 961, 967 (1970).
173. Id. See Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979)
(courts should rely on the traditional approach to avoid the danger that a court might
create liability by construction of the contract terms or creation of a new contract for
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seemed preoccupied with the costs involved in defense of PRP
74
notifications and potential liability for CERCLA cleanup costs.'
While their focus on these costs and lack of focus on the policy
language does not necessarily indicate an abuse of discretion in
their decisions to expand insurers' coverage to include defense
costs, it does indicate a belief that placing the costs on insurers is
reasonable. '
Another example of this belief is in the Specialty Coatings
court's focus on the fact that PRPs are potentially liable whether
they defend their notifications, comply with EPA requirements, or
wait for the EPA to cleanup. 7 6 The court's interpretation of "suit"
was clearly influenced by the seemingly inevitable costs that would
be incurred by the insured. 7 7 However, the court's assertion that a
notification should qualify as a "suit" because a subsequent government action to compel reimbursement would necessarily trigger
defense appears premature.
In an action compelling reimbursement pursuant to CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(A), the EPA has cleaned the site itself and brings
a court action to recover cleanup costs. A section 107(a)(4)(A)
action compelling reimbursement, unlike notification of PRP status,
raises both the issues of insurers' duty to defend and duty to
indemnify. Once indemnification becomes an issue, more language
from the duty to defend clause is relevant to the determination of
defense: "[T]he Company shall have the right and duty to defend
any suit against the insured seeking damages . . . even if any of
the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent . .. .178 While a reimbursement action would clearly provide
the court action required to meet the attributes of a "suit," the
insurer's duty to defend a "suit" may further depend on whether
the "damages" alleged in the suit trigger indemnification. Although
the expansive language requiring defense "even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless . . ." has given insurers a
duty to defend potentially broader than their duty to indemnify, 17

the parties); Fried v. North River Ins. Co., 710 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1983) (equitable
considerations should not be emphasized in insurance construction to re-write terms of
the policy).
174. See supra notes 144-148, 153-159 and accompanying text.
175. See infra note 187.
176. See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
178. See T. HAmILTON & K. KoWAL, supra note 16, at 48.
179. Id. ("Pursuant to this language, the insurer has a right and duty to defend

1990:579]

WHETHER INSURERS MUST DEFEND PRP NOTIFICATIONS

607

the fourth and eighth U.S. Circuits have, nevertheless, decided that
where CERCLA cleanup costs do not trigger indemnification as
"damages," neither do they trigger defense.8 0 Whether a CERCLA
reimbursement action represents the necessary damages to trigger
insurers' duty to indemnify under CGL language is currently unsettled and the Third, Fourth, and Eighth U.S. Circuits have
8
decided it does not.' '

litigation against the insured which seeks recovery for covered... damage[s]. Additionally, the insurer must defend its insured even if the allegations of the suit which allege
covered ... damage[s], giving rise to the insurer's duty to defend, are groundless, false
or fraudulent."). But see infra note 180.
180. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987)
(applying Maryland law). After holding "damages" to encompass only legal damages
and not equitable CERCLA cleanup costs pursuant to a 107(a)(4)(A) action, the court
went on to address the issue of defense:
Armco has argued that the duty to defend is broader than Maryland Casualty's
obligation to reimburse Armco for damages and that the district court erred
in construing the terms in pari materia [together in the same subject matter],
with the effect of holding that Maryland Casualty had no duty to defend
Armco .... The insurance contract provides that Maryland Casualty will
defend any suit against Armco which alleges "such injury, . . . even if such
suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent .... ." Thus, the duty to defend arises
only where there is an allegation of "such injury," which phrase refers to the
liability of the insurance company to pay on behalf of Armco the sums which
Armco will become legally obligated "to pay as damages because of injury to
or destruction of property . . ." It is clear that the duty to defend and the
duty to reimburse are to be interpreted coterminously, and because we hold
that the claim in the CCC litigation does not allege a claim for damages as
defined in the policy, then a mere "possibility" of liability on behalf of
Maryland Casualty does not arise.
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying
South Carolina law) (After the court held that insured's CGL policy did not cover
indemification for CERCLA cleanup costs pursuant to a section 107(a)(4)(A) action
because they did not constitute legal "damages," it next held that "[a]lthough an
insurance carrier's duty to defend is broader than the coverage it affords, for reasons
adequately stated in Armco, 822 F.2d at 1264 [sic], Cincinnati was not obligated to
defend the action brought by the United States."); Continental Ins. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Maryland law) (in an action
covering both defense and indemnification issues regarding CERCLA cleanup costs
pursuant to a section 107(a)(4)(A) action, the court held that insurer had no duty to
defend because cleanup costs under section 107(a)(4)(A) were equitable and therefore
not covered under insured's CGL policy as "damages").
181. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (insurer
refused to defend or indemnify insured for a mandatory injunction and the court held
that "[tihe obligation of the insurer to pay is limited to 'damages,' a word which has
an accepted technical meaning in law .... This is a far cry from the cost to unsuccessful
litigants of complying with an injunctive decree."). This distinction is particularly
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As a practical matter, applying contra-insurer rules in the duty
to defend PRP notification cases may have been inappropriate
important in CERCLA actions for cleanup costs, which have been held to be equitable
and therefore not applicable as "damages" within CGLs. See Continental Ins. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Maryland law).
The circuit court decided the insurer had no duty to defend because cleanup costs under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A) were equitable and therefore not covered under the
insured's CGL policy "as damages." The court found the limited construction of
"damages" to be consistent with the provision defining the insurer's obligation as a
whole; "Continental did not agree to pay 'all sums which the insured shall become liable
to pay.' Continental agreed to pay 'all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages.' The expansive reading of the term 'damages' urged by
the state would render the term 'all sums' virtually meaningless." Id. at 986. The court
also found a limited construction of the term "damages" to be consistent with the
traditional distinction drawn between money damages and injunctive relief. Id. Lastly,
the court found the limited construction of "damages" consistent with the statutory
scheme of CERCLA section 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), which differentiates
between cleanup costs and damages. Id. As in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Il.App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989), where the court
reasoned that it made little monetary difference whether a PRP incurred costs voluntarily
or incurred them after refusing to comply with the government, the State in Continental
Ins. attempted to argue that since there may be little difference between the dollar
amount the insured may have to pay as cleanup costs under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A),
and the dollar amount the insured may have to pay as damages under CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(C), that they should both be considered "damages" under the CGL policy.
Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 987. The circuit court in Continental Ins. clearly stated
that while there might, in fact, be no practical difference between the costs, "[nionetheless,
the type of relief sought is critical to the insured and the insurer, because under CGL
policies the insurer is liable only for legal damages, not for equitable monetary relief,
such as cleanup costs." See Cordes, supra note 11. Since section 107(a)(4)(C) is limited
to post-CERCLA damages, it is likely that the EPA will focus more on actions in equity
under section 107(a)(4)(A) which can be applied retroactively)); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland law) (equitable or
injunctive relief is not applicable under policy as "damages"); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying South Carolina law) (CGL
policies generally do not extend coverage to claims for equitable relief. In the insurance
context "damages" is not ambiguous, it means legal damages.); United States v. Nicolet,
Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 209-10 (3d Cir. 1988) (CERCLA response cost action seeking
reimbursement is regulatory and not a legal claim for "damages"); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Ross Electric of Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (under
Washington law, environmental cleanup costs claimed, or to be claimed from an insured,
were not within coverage of policy where coverage was limited to "damages" because
CERCLA costs are equitable rather than legal damages). See also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731-32 (1988) (the Supreme Court found that although an
equitable remedy may require an insured to pay money, "(tlhe fact that a judicial
remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient reason to
characterize the relief as 'money damages'); AIU Ins. Co. v. The Superior Court of
Santa Clara County, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219, 262 Cal. Rptr. 182, (1989) ("damages" as

1990:579]

WHETHER INSURERS MUST DEFEND PRP NOTIFICATIONS

609

because all of the parties involved in the duty to defend cases have
been commercial entities.18 2 The commercial status of the insureds
generally means that none of the parties involved suffered from a
lack of bargaining power at the time the insurance policies were
made and do not, therefore, need special court attention to protect
their interests. 183 The courts which have extended coverage have
arguably overlooked the traditional and intended meaning of the
language in favor of allocating the cost of defending PRP notifications to insurers. 18 4 It seems implicit in the courts' decisions that
they assume insurers can absorb the costs of defending the notifications and subsequent indemnification," 5 which is not a practical
used in policies was unambiguous and did not include response or remedial costs);
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 618 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (the type of relief available
under CERCLA is equitable which excludes the possibility of jury trial). But see New
Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987)
(injunctive and other equitable relief may constitute "damages" with in coverage);
United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838
(1983) (the court discussed whether a suit seeking mandatory cleanup was covered under
insured's CGL and decided that the remedy's injunctive nature should not prevent
triggering the insurer's duty to defend a "suit seeking damages"); Aerojet-General Corp.
v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, (1989)
(response costs constitute "damages" under CGLs).
182. Dextrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 440
(N.D. Ohio 1987); Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141
A.D.2d 124, 125, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (1988); Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713
F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F.
Supp. 71, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Pepper's Steel and Alloys v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (1989).
183. M.GLATT & L. HOBEL, Liability Insurance Disputes in TECHNIQUES OF SELFINSURANCE 343, 345 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 400,
1986) (Contra-insurer rules of construction "are under attack as inappropriate for
business insurance policies where the insured is of significant size, is sophisticated, used
sophisticated brokers or counsel in negotiations or had equivalent bargaining power .... ")
(citing Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1983); Eagle Leasing
Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (1976), rehearingdenied, 546 F.2d
906, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977); Eastern Associated Coal v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981)).
184. These decisions reflect the judicial preference for using insurance as an injury

compensation mechanism. See Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic
Tort Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 123 (1982) (this article provides

a general discussion of the pros and cons of this approach); Cheek, Graham &
Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10204 (one must remember that judges read the same polls
that everyone else reads, and regardless of their duty to uphold the law and not dabble
in popular notions as an excuse to find insurance coverage, they are human and may
very well be influenced by socioeconomic, as well as legal, considerations).
185. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availabilityl
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long-term solution.86 While these decisions realistically assess the
harsh ramifications of PRP notifications,8 7 they may be making
unrealistic and inequitable expansions of coverage by focusing on
addressing those ramifications instead of the policy language. 88
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTENDING THE INSURERS' DUTY

To

DEFEND

Extending the insurers' duty of defense to include PRP notifications forces insurers to absorb costs for which they have not
prepared. 8 9 As previously discussed, insurers did not assess the
risks of CERCLA related claims into their pre-1980 CGLs and,
therefore, the costs of defense and indemnification were not spread
among insureds now designated as PRPs.' 9° Because the risks were
Affordability Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AimEcAN U. L. REv. 285, 308-09
(1988) (courts have ignored the limits of the insurance system in past strict liability
recovery situations because the national insurance pool, which initially allowed the tort
system to function as a compensation mechanism, seemed inexhaustible). American
Home Prods. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Col, 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1511 (1983) (where the court
said:
Relying on social policy to justify imputing an expectation of complete coverage
to the insured is, in any event, legally insupportable. The only doctrinal basis
for enforcing expectations in the fact of contrary policy provisions - the socalled reasonable expectations doctrine relied on in Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042 n.
12 - is reserved for situations in which the expectations enforced are strongly
demonstrated, and the policy involved is a contract of adhesion.).
Id. at 1511 (citing Keaton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HAgv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970)).
186. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.
Mich. 1987); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Il. App.
3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989).
188. See supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
189. See Abraham, supra note 43, at 961 ("An unexpected judicial interpretation
extending coverage beyond what was intended works like a mandatory retroactive price
decrease. Insurers suffer an immediate financial loss, lose a measure of confidence in
the fairness of the judicial system, and come to doubt their ability to predict future
judicial developments."); Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 19:
Hazardous waste claims often have a number of common elements which make
them uniquely expensive to defend, let alone indemnify. The activity causing
the pollution, as well as the pollution itself, are often of long duration and the
injury or damage alleged is often not detected until years after the initial
dumping of wastes. Moreover, such claims often involve multiple plaintiffs,
multiple defendants, multiple insurance carriers and coverage layers, and
multiple policy periods. As a result, hazardous waste claims are extremely
complex in nature and raise significant coverage questions.
Id. at 568.
190. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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not spread among insureds, insurers have no prepared funds with
which to address CERCLA-related claims.' 9' Insurers must instead
take the necessary funding from the same general insurance pool
192
that encompasses the insurers' other planned commitments.
The funds necessary to defend a PRP notification can be
formidable. 93 Insureds may request reimbursement for investigation costs, or insurers may undertake the investigations themselves
which typically include environmental consultation, formulating a
remedial action and the implementation of those plans. 94 These
investigation costs often equal or exceed the amount ultimately
necessary to cleanup the toxic waste pollution underlying the original claim against the insured. 95 Similar costs result from judicial
inconsistency regarding defense of PRP notifications. 96 The conflict within the state and federal courts promotes litigation of the
issue and there is already overwhelming evidence that the cost of
this litigation has risen beyond the cost of initially complying with
the settlement process. 197 This is not only a detriment to insurers
and insureds, but also wastes funds that could be used to cleanup
toxic waste pollution. 198 The financial losses involved when insurers
litigate the issue of PRP notification defense and subsequently lose
do not necessarily end with the costs of the litigation and defense. 199
The courts which hold insurers liable for defense are likely to also
hold insurers liable for indemnification. 200 Because expanding "suit"
191. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text; see also T. HAMILTON & K.
KowAL, supra note 16, at 38.
192. D. REEs, Have Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims Created an Insurance
Crisis - Where do we do from Here?, in ENVIRoNmENTAL AND ToXIc TORT CLIMS 419,
426 (Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 495, 1989).
193. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
194. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.04[a].

195. Id. (it is well settled that these costs are a part of the insurer's duty to defend)
(citing Carter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 473 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1973); Daniels v.
Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970); Royal Transit, Inc. v. Central
Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 884 (1948)). See
T. NEwMAN, Mega-Coverage Case Cost Sharing Proposals, in INSURANCE, ExcEss, AND
REINSURANCE COVERAE DmsUTEs 587 (Litigation and Administrative Practice Course

Handbook Series, PLI Order No. H4-5062, 1989) (Westlaw screen 2 of 9) ("It is no
exaggeration to say that hundreds of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars are at
stake.").
196. See Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203-04.
197. Id. See M. LATHROP, supra note 8, at 163 (enormous resources directed at
litigating coverage cases may soar into the millions).
198. See Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203-04.
199. See infra text accompanying note 200.
200. See Fireman's Fund Ins. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich.
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beyond its traditional meaning requires a court finding of ambiguity, such a finding may indicate a court's propensity to find
further ambiguities in policy language controlling the duty to

indemnify .201

The insurers' options in attempting to avoid the costs associated with being held liable for defense are limited. Insurers cannot
retroactively charge insured polluters to reflect the cost of defending PRP notifications, 20 2 nor can they expect new policy-holders to
make up for the loss. 20 3 Insurers cannot escape further losses by
post-hoc clarification of the language in their pre-1980 policies
20 4
seeking to avoid the possibility of court-perceived ambiguities.
The potential for court-perceived ambiguities and contra-insurer
construction presents a considerable threat for insurers who have
issued CGLs, because application of contra-insurer rules is often
outcome determinative in coverage disputes. 20 1 Many state courts
have recognized the "reasonable expectations" form of contrainsurer policy construction, 206 including the state courts of Michigan, 20 7 New York, 208 and Idaho, 20 9 which are currently favorable to
1987); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d
378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983).
201. See supra note 200.
202. See Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203.
203. Id. (any company that tried to shift this kind of a burden to new policy
holders would lose market shares as well as policyholders).
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
206. See HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[bo] (citing decisions from 30 states
including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas
and Wisconsin).
207. Id. Michigan, which favored insurers in Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Ins.
Co., 713 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mich. 1989), has recognized the reasonable expectations
doctrine previously in Crowell v. Federal Life & Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 614, 247 N.W.2d
503 (1976), and Fresard v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 97 Mich. App. 584, 296
N.W.2d 112 (1980), aff'd, 414 Mich. 686, 327 N.W.2d 286 (1982).
208. See HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at § 1.03[b]. Although New York favored
insurers on the duty to defend PRP notifications issue in Technicon Elecs. Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988), several New
York courts have recognized the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Board of Educ.
v. CNA Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1495 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1988);
Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 400 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
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insurers. California case law strictly applying contra-insurer rules
offers particularly harsh results for insurers. 2 10 One California court
has gone as far as to hold that an implied contractual obligation
to defend exists based solely upon the reasonable expectation of
the insured, 21 ' and several courts have adopted this extreme posi21 2
tion.
It has been suggested that as a result of inconsistent and
expansive court decisions over the insurers' duty to defend PRP
notifications as well as to indemnify in the event of liability, there
may be an insurance crisis. 213 Insurers have been withdrawing from
offering pollution coverage specifically because the courts' interpretations of CGL language with respect to CERCLA have broadened their liability for coverage beyond what was intended under
21 4
past policies.
The inconsistency among state and federal court decisions has
caused insurers to lose confidence in the judicial system and doubt
their ability to predict future developments. 215 Insurers left with
drawing from their general insurance pool to fund expanded coverage point out the impracticality of expecting this to be a longterm solution. 2 6 While the estimated costs of future cleanups is up
qff'd, 546 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Atlantic Cement
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 91 A.D.2d 412, 459 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1983), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d
798, 471 N.E.2d 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1984).
209. See HAND)OOK, supra note 17, § 1.03[b], although the court in Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources and Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1989), stated
that the reasonable expectations doctrine is not applied in Idaho, one Idaho court has
previously recognized it in its broadest capacity; Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accid. Ins.
Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975) (plurality opinion) (invocation of the doctrine
of reasonable expectations does not depend on presence of ambiguities).
210. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
211. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 800,
129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 53 (1976).
212. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271
(Minn. 1985); Raska v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 412 Mich. 355, 314 N.W.2d 440
(1982); Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 141 (Ind. 1981); Rodman
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1973).
213. REES, supra note 192, at 420-23. See also W. MAHONEY, The Role of Insurance
in Reducing Cost of Remedial Cleanup, in PRAcTicAL APPROACHES TO REDUCE EwiRONmENTAL CLEAN P COSTS 251, 253 (Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 317, 1989) (insurance companies who are willing to accept a transfer of the
risk of pollution are dwindling in the direction of a legitimate crisis).
214. REEs, supra note 192, at 420-24.
215. See Abraham, supra note 43, at 960.
216. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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to $700-800 billion, the entire industry's pool is limited at approximately $100 billion. 2"1 The state and federal courts' conflicting
decisions over PRP notifications are essentially a microcosm of the
general judicial indecision over whether to include CERLCA liability within traditional CGLs, which leaves insurers at risk of further
depleting the insurance pool with every PRP designation of an
insured."'

VI.

RECOMMENDATION

Although relatively few state and federal courts have addressed
the specific issue of insurers' duty to defend PRP notifications, the
existing decisions are likely to be indicative of future conflicts and
unexpected expansions of insurance coverage. 21 9 Insurers have already suffered great financial loss as a result of courts finding a
duty to defend where none was planned and in the litigation
necessary to determine the issue. 220 Because claims for defense of
PRP notifications will only increase in the future 22' and neither
party involved can be assured of success given the current state of
the law, insurers should seek a nonlitigative approach to an insured's claim for defense coverage.
Negotiation has been used in many disputes to avoid costly
formal processes, 222 and is clearly needed by insurers in order to
avoid the various courtroom battles that typically result after an
insured receives a PRP notification. Initially, insurers should attempt to gather their insured PRPs together with other PRPs of
the same site to discuss common issues. Involvement at the beginning of the CERCLA settlement is crucial so insurers can have an
impact on the decisions concerning required cleanup measures and
223
apportionment of liability, if possible, amongst the various PRPs.
Currently, most large CERCLA cases generate a "PRP steering
217. REEs, supra note 192, at 425-26.
218. See Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 19, at 569-70; Cheek, Graham &
Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203.
219. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10203-05.
220. Id.
221. REEs, supra note 192, at 425 ("The inevitability of the claims in the future
cannot be questioned. There are extensive lists of hazardous waste sites, and there seems
to be little doubt that many of these sites require immediate cleanup or containment.").
222. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 328.
223. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083 n.9 (D. Colo.
1985) (PRPs may be held jointly and severally liable for the costs of cleaning up a site
where the contribution is clearly divisible). See generally Superfund Program,supra note
53.
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committee" which is established to deal with the EPA. 224 A committee of this type can be used to reduce the cost of negotiating
with the EPA and increase bargaining power by acting as a single
large entity. Also, by joining together on common issues, information and ideas can be exchanged at far less expense than if each
225
party were to research alone.
The PRPs and their insurers could work through the committee
under a reservation of rights so that none of the parties would
jeopardize their positions on coverage issues should group negotiation prove unsuccessful. However, PRPs have another general
concern over reserving their rights in that they fear the appearance
of liability from immediate negotiation with the EPA. Their concern is genuine because the EPA is under no obligation to find all
the PRPs involved with a site, or to ensure costs are divided fairly
among those that are located. 226 To counter this, insurers might
attempt to formulate an agreement with the EPA, short of acquiesing to a voluntary cleanup, that the parties designated as potentially
responsible would begin an immediate research and cost study
before they agree to any settlement procedures.
In the past the EPA has ignored the voluntary efforts of some
PRPs when making settlement decisions concerning both voluntary
and non-negotiating PRPs. 227 Insurers might stress this fact to get
extra time to research the site or attempt an agreement with the
EPA to take action against the non-negotiating PRPs before voluntary participants. Insurers should also press the EPA for greater
disclosure of information than it has been willing to allow in the
past. 228 Such actions on the insurer's part would make immediate
involvement far more attractive to PRPs and increase their overall
willingness to negotiate.
Although negotiating with PRPs may not seem attractive to
insurers who have not prepared for these defense costs, the goal of
this negotiation is to avoid the far greater costs of unpredictable
litigation. Unless the courts adopt a uniform stance on the duty to
defend issue, insurers would be wise to develop a finely tuned set
of attorneys to deal specifically with negotiations between insured
PRPs and the EPA.2 29
224. Cheek, Graham & Wardzinski, supra note 9, at 10205.
225. See Pain, supra note 67, at 15054.
226. See Superfund Program, supra note 53, at 5301. See generally Neuman, No
Way out? The Plight of the Superfund Nonsettlor, 20 ELR 10295 (July 1990).
227. See Pain, supra note 67, at 15054.
228. Id.
229. See generally R. Marzulla, Superfund '91 - Congress' Chance to Clean Up Its

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

CONCLUSION

As a result of the conflicting decisions among the state and
federal courts over the duty to defend PRP notifications, insurers are
left without any set legal foundation to rely upon in coverage disputes.
Although insurers are currently favored in a small majority of the
courts' decisions, the discretionary nature of insurance law may impact
any given court's decision regardless of these precedents.
As demonstrated by the courts in Ex-Cell-O, Pepper's Steel, and
Specialty Coatings, a court may not follow the rules of insurance
contract interpretation in their entirety. Given the complex and economically charged nature of CERCLA, courts have several issues
facing them as they interpret coverage under CGLs, issues they may
not be able to separate from the interpretive task at hand. Because
of this situation, insurers might better serve their economic needs by
disregarding the traditional emphasis on litigating coverage issues,
and opting for immediate negotiation with insured PRPs and the
EPA.
JOANNA

Act, RISK MANAGEMENT

L. JOHNSON

32 (April 1990) (Westlaw screen 1990 WL 119714 (IPI))

(advocating that insurers take a greater role in directing their insureds' cleanup programs

under CERCLA); R. MALLEN, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, in
HAzARDous WASTE, Toxic TORT, AND PRODUCTS LIALrrY INSURANCE PROBLEMS 123

(Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 378, 1986) (for information
on analyzing conflicts, damages, noncovered hazards, exposure, independent counsel,
contract revision, discretionary reservation of rights, and marketing defense counsel).

